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Abstract: While the number of African COVID-19 cases is relatively limited for
now, the pandemic and the restrictive measures to curtail the virus might have
important implications for the level of human security. They may give rise to
economic decline and rising poverty, authoritarianism, urban violence, and
increasing social inequalities. In this proceeding, we will outline the mechanisms
through which these consequences may take hold in Africa.
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1 Introduction
After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in China and its quick spread to
Europe and the United States, scholars and NGO representatives warned for the
potentially grave consequences in Africa where most countries have limited heath
care capacities. The first African coronavirus casewas confirmed on February 14 in
Egypt and the virus has now spread to virtually all corners of the continent.
Currently (mid-June 2020), Africa counts more than 250,000 confirmed cases, and
has suffered over 6500 deaths (African Arguments Coronavirus in Africa Tracker
2020). These figures suggest that a continent of 1.2bn people has witnessed fewer
COVID-19 deaths than any other continent.
Several explanations are offered for this paradox. It may well be due to the
potential undercounting ofAfrican cases as a result of limited testing capacities. This
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is partly due to restricted export of medical goods and the extreme difficulties Af-
rican health authorities face in competing for these goods on the international
market. Others have pointed to the potential resilient effect of Africa’s large youth
population. Themedian age of Africa is under 20 years—less than half that of Italy—
and international data shows that risk of serious medical complications and death
from COVID-19 rises significantly with age. Furthermore, the African climate might
have also slowed down its progress. The virus does perhaps not spread as efficiently
in warmer and more humid climates. Lastly, African governments were relatively
quick to adopt a range of aggressivemeasures that helpedmitigate the spread of the
virus. They implemented very strict lockdowns, declaring states of emergency, and
re-trained their vast standing armies of community health workers even when no or
single cases were reported. The successful implementation of these measures is
likely due to their past experience with other health crises, such as Ebola.
While the number of COVID-19 cases is relatively limited for now, the
pandemic and the restrictive measures to curtail the virus have important impli-
cations for the level of human security. Theymay give rise to economic decline and
rising poverty, physical violence, authoritarianism, and increasing social in-
equalities. Below, we outline the mechanisms through which these consequences
may take hold in Africa.
2 Macro and Micro Economic Consequences
Prior to COVID-19, the African continent already experienced a slowdown in
growth and poverty reduction overall, although with large differences between
countries. The presence of COVID-19 will likely have increasingly negative con-
sequences for African economies (OECD 2020). Growth forecasts, which are
constantly updated, sketch a very pessimistic picture. The African Development
Bank issued a statement at the beginning of April that they projected a GDP growth
contraction of between 0.7 and 2.8 percentage points in 2020 (ADFB 2020). Ac-
cording to the World Bank (mid-April predictions), the COVID-19 outbreak has set
off the first recession in the Sub-Saharan African region in 25 years, with growth
forecast between −2.1 and −5.1% in 2020 from a modest 2.4% in 2019 (World Bank
2020a). An updated outlook of theWorld Bank (published at the beginning of June
2020), predicts that the sub-Saharan region is expected to contract by 2.8% this
year—the sharpest contraction on record (World Bank 2020b).
COVID-19 affects African economies through domestic and external channels
(OECD 2020). Not only will trade and investment from China and its European part-
ners decline, but plummeting oil and other commodity prices are likely to add to this
economicdistress.Moreover, therewill likelybea continental supply shockaffecting
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domestic and intra-African trade. The shock to internal demand will be driven by
disruptions in household and business spending, and will particularly hit countries
affected by strict confinement measures, such as South Africa (OECD 2020).
A serious recession is now likely for many African countries, with rippling
effects on already high poverty numbers. For instance, the World Food Program
estimated a 70% rise in food insecurity to 21 million people inWest-Africa this year
before the COVID-19 outbreak, but now anticipates a further 22 million becoming
reliant of food aid by August 2020 (World Food Programme 2020). This is exac-
erbated by the fact thatmany humanitarian organisations have already suspended
relief programmes due to government restrictions. For instance, countries such as
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan have placed strict re-
strictions on entry for foreign staff, impacting logistics supply and day to day
operations for food aid (UN-OCHA 2020).
Low levels of economic development, slow or negative economic growth, and
increases in food prices are also determinants of social unrest and violence (e.g.,
Blattman and Miguel 2010). Increasing poverty levels may lead to a rise in crimi-
nality but can also push some of the poorest consumers toward joining armed
groups in order to maintain a living wage. While the actual occurrence of (large-
scale) violence always depends on a complex interplay of factors, severe economic
recession may place especially fragile countries already affected by conflict and
rebellion more at risk.
3 Disruption of Democratic Processes
COVID-19 is also intersecting with security institutions and important political
processes on the continent. One development that we are currently observing in
some African countries is that the COVID-19 crisis has disrupted registration,
campaigns, and other activities related to upcoming elections. While some
countries have held elections amid the pandemic, others have chosen to postpone
them (IDEA 2020). For instance, elections have effectively been postponed in
Ethiopia. Two weeks after the first case of COVID-19 was detected in this country,
the Ethiopian authorities declared a state of emergency, and parliamentary elec-
tions to elect the Prime Minister, initially scheduled for August 2020, have been
postponed until “the pandemic is over” (FIDH 2020).
Postponement of elections can be regarded as legitimate, as long as it does not
cross the threshold to manipulation. However, previous health crises on the Af-
rican continent, such as the Ebola outbreak in the eastern provinces of the Dem-
ocratic Republic of the Congo, have illustrated that these crises can be used to
disenfranchise a large number of people and to increase possibilities for electoral
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manipulation. For instance, before the general elections in Burundi in May 2020,
the Burundi government announced a 14-day quarantine requirement for any
observers entering the country due to the coronavirus pandemic. Consequently,
election observers were not able to follow up the electoral process because the
quarantine period would elapse two days after the elections were held (Africa
CGTN 2020). Also in Guinea a referendum was held in a context of general unrest.
The constitutional change ushered in the referendum is believed to be away for the
President to seek additional presidential mandates despite the fact that he has
already served twice (FIDH 2020). Opposition parties boycotted the election and
independent election observers were absent.
Given that Western countries are currently focused on battling the pandemic
on their own grounds, international criticism towards African incumbents that
change electoral procedures may be very limited. Manipulating democratic pro-
cess can not only foster authoritarianism and increase the likelihood of electoral
violence, but can also cause severe rifts between societal groups, causing large-
scale armed conflict (as has already been seen in the past in Côte d’Ivoire and
Kenya).
4 Downscaling Peacebuilding and Humanitarian
Activities
Although the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres urged warring
parties across the world to lay down their weapons in support of the bigger battle
against COVID-19, his call for a global truce did not gain momentum in Africa.
Some regions have seen an upsurge in violent attacks in March and April 2020
(Deschmidt and Neat 2020). In northern Africa, fighting flared up between the
warring parties in Libya. In the Sahel, Boko Haram insurgents launched several
attacks in Chad. In the Horn of Africa, Al-Shabaab continued daily attacks on
civilian populations. In Southern Africa, the Islamic State has recently stepped up
its brutal attacks in Mozambique (Deschmidt and Neat 2020). This situation has
been further compounded by the UN’s decision to suspend the rotation and
deployment of all international peacekeepers until 30 June 2020. At the same time,
critical operations have been delayed or cancelled as military and police forces are
quarantined (UN 2020).
Besides these changes in peacebuilding activities, many development pro-
fessional are expecting cuts to international development aid (Smith and Chad-
wick 2020). Given the economic recovery that many Western donor countries are
now facing, the competition to maintain official development assistance levels
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with domestic priorities is enormous. Although some short-term emergency funds
have been recently created dedicated to help the poorest populations – among
others on the African continent – concerns are expressed over long-term back-
sliding ondevelopment gains. Overseas development aid could dropby asmuch as
$25 billion by 2021, according to projections by Development Initiatives, an or-
ganization that focuses on data and development (Smith and Chadwick 2020). The
decrease in peacebuilding activities and humanitarian aid might further com-
pound the already fragile situation of most African countries.
5 Urban Violence
While African governments have been complimented for their quick action in the
face of the pandemic, the ways in which lockdown measures have been imple-
mented have raised substantial political concern. Indeed, emergency measures in
response to COVID-19 echo previous state crackdowns in the wake of terror attacks
and other conflict events. Kenyan police have killed several peoplewhile enforcing
a dusk-to-dawn curfew, making it the deadliest lockdown in the world. Amnesty
International reported that police in Zambia assaulted people who were found
gathering in bars. Zimbabwean security forces manhandled hundreds of traders
because they were selling their produce at a market without permission. In South
Africa too, police have been heavy-handed in response to anyone disobeying
lockdown measures. The UN Commission for Human Rights has even explicitly
called South Africa out for using undue force in the lockdown; there have been
nearly 120,000 arrests for non-compliance, and at least two people have been
murdered by security forces.
Lockdown measures have especially been used in densely populated urban
areas. It is exactly in these settings that policymakers and scholars have raised
concerns for conflict and instability (e.g., Buhaug and Urdal 2013). Many African
cities now count several millions of inhabitants, while poverty remains high.
Slumification, a lack of public services, and job insecurity are considered as
driving factors behind violent riots. Lockdown measures add to this precarity of
existence.
6 Rising Social Inequalities
The COVID-19 pandemicmight also exacerbate existing group tensions. Especially
marginalized groups, such as migrants and refugees, may be the victim of such
stereotyping and become characterized as being the main carriers of the disease.
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These dynamics already occurred during the Ebola crisis in West-Africa. In
Senegal, for example, xenophobia against Peul migrants from Guinea was
heightened during the crisis (Onoma 2020). Social media may play an aggravating
role in this by spreading rumours, misinformation, and fake news about the
pandemic (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies 2020). The spread of this misinfor-
mation stands in the way of an effective response to the virus. In addition, it may
also be used to spread hate speech and incite violence.
The pandemic might also exacerbate other existing inequalities. Natural di-
sasters, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, do not affect people equally. Although
preliminary evidence show that men suffer from a higher rate of fatality over
women – inequalities in access to resources, capabilities and opportunities sys-
tematically disadvantage women, indirectly rendering them more vulnerable to
the pandemic in several ways (Neuymayer and Plumper 2007). First, African
women are at the front lines of the response to the pandemic. Over 60% of Africa’s
health workforce and essential social service providers are female (Chuku,
Mukasa, and Yasin 2020). Also back at home, women are primary responsible for
taking case of the sick and elderly. COVID-19 then also amplify women’s unpaid
work burden. Second, women are more likely to be employed in informal or low-
paying sectors, which are sectors that are most at risk during the pandemic
(Copley, Decker, and Delavelle 2020). At the same time, women that work as
farmers, have often lower access to productive inputs, information, and liquidity
thanmen—so in times of crisis, their farm productivity and food security will likely
be hit hard (Copley, Decker, and Delavelle 2020). Third, when economic resources
become scarcer, it is especially women that are hit hard. Income shocks especially
effect the enrolment of girls – and not so much for boys – in schools (Björkviost-
Nyqvist 2013). Moreover, food is often unequally distributed within the fam-
ily– with a distinct sex bias (against the female) and also an age bias (against the
children) (Neuymayer and Plumper 2007). Lastly, a recent study by UN Women
(2020) found that that the risk of gender-based violence is heightened during times
of crisis, isolation, and confinement. COVID-19 is then also likely to result in a step
backwards for equality movement which has much influence on human security.
7 Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic risks magnifying pre-existing economic, social and po-
litical vulnerabilities on the African continent. It can not only push many people
into extreme poverty, but it can exacerbate political tensions by halting democratic
processes, increasing government’s power due to the lockdownmeasures, and can
increase intergroup conflict. While the trajectory of the COVID-19 crisis will have a
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determining role on the extent to which these consequences occur, it is important
to remain vigilant for the broader human security threats posed by the pandemic.
By highlighting these potential impacts, we hence argue for increased attention
towards the implementation of measures to reduce the economic and social im-
pacts of the pandemic, and prevent violent conflict.
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